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Several simulation theories have been proposed as an explanation for how humans
and other agents internalize an “inner world” that allows them to simulate interactions
with the external real world – prospectively and retrospectively. Such internal simulation
of interaction with the environment has been argued to be a key mechanism behind
mentalizing and planning. In the present work, we study internal simulations in a robot
acting in a simulated human environment. A model of sensory–motor interactions with the
environment is generated from human demonstrations and tested on a Robosoft Kompaï
robot. The model is used as a controller for the robot, reproducing the demonstrated
behavior. Information from several different demonstrations is mixed, allowing the robot
to produce novel paths through the environment, toward a goal specified by top-down
contextual information. The robot model is also used in a covert mode, where the execu-
tion of actions is inhibited and perceptions are generated by a forward model. As a result,
the robot generates an internal simulation of the sensory–motor interactions with the
environment. Similar to the overt mode, the model is able to reproduce the demonstrated
behavior as internal simulations. When experiences from several demonstrations are
combined with a top-down goal signal, the system produces internal simulations of novel
paths through the environment. These results can be understood as the robot imagining
an “inner world” generated from previous experience, allowing it to try out different
possible futures without executing actions overtly. We found that the success rate in
terms of reaching the specified goal was higher during internal simulation, compared
to overt action. These results are linked to a reduction in prediction errors generated
during covert action. Despite the fact that the model is quite successful in terms of
generating covert behavior toward specified goals, internal simulations display different
temporal distributions compared to their overt counterparts. Links to human cognition
and specifically mental imagery are discussed.
Keywords: embodied cognition, imagination, internal simulation, learning from demonstration, representation,
simulation theory, predictive sequence learning, prospection
Frontiers in Robotics and AI | www.frontiersin.org March 2016 | Volume 3 | Article 91
Billing et al. Reenacting and Recombining Sensorimotor Episodes
1. INTRODUCTION
Cognitive science has traditionally equated cognition with the
processing of symbolic internal representations of an external
world [e.g., Pylyshyn (1984), Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988), Newell
(1990), and Anderson (1996)]. While clearly humans experience
some kind of “inner world,” i.e., the ability to imagine their envi-
ronment and their own interactions with it embodied/situated
theories of cognition [e.g., Varela et al. (1991), Clancey (1997),
Clark (1997), and Lakoff and Johnson (1999)] have questioned
the traditional view of symbolic mental representations. In arti-
ficial intelligence research, in particular, some have argued for
the need of “symbol grounding” (Harnad, 1990), i.e., the ground-
ing of amodal symbolic representations in non-symbolic iconic
and categorical representations that allow to connect senses to
symbols, while others have argued that the “physical grounding”
of “embodied” and “situated” robots simply makes representa-
tion unnecessary [e.g., Brooks (1991)]. In this context, alterna-
tive accounts of cognition as based on different types of mental
simulation or emulation have gained substantial interest [e.g.,
Barsalou (1999), Hesslow (2002), Grush (2004), Gallese (2005),
and Svensson (2013)]. According to these theories, the “inner
world” and the human capacity for imagination are based on
internally simulated action and perception, i.e., the brain’s ability
to (re- or pre-) activate itself as if it was in actual sensorimotor
interaction with the external world.
While there have been many advances in providing robots
with some kind of inner world, the inner worlds of robots have
traditionally been based on predefined ontologies and still lack
in complexity and flexibility compared to the inner worlds of
humans. In this paper, we describe a learning mechanism that
enables a simulated robot to mentally imagine moving around
in an apartment environment. The robot does not only repeat
previously experienced routes but also shows a kind of organic
compositionality (Tani et al., 2008), allowing it to reenact – and
recombine – parts of previous sensory–motor interactions in
novel ways. The basic mechanism underlying this is grounded
in simulation theories, in particular, the type of mechanisms
suggested by Hesslow (2002) and consists of learning associations
between sensor and motor events.
In the present work, we combine previous efforts on internal
simulation (Stening et al., 2005; Ziemke et al., 2005; Svensson,
2013) with those on Learning from Demonstration (LFD) (Billing,
2012) into a model that can learn from human demonstrations
and reenact the demonstrated behavior both overtly and covertly.
We here evaluate several aspects of such covert action: (1) can
the robot produce internal simulations similar to a previously
executed overt behavior; (2) towhat extent can the systemproduce
internal simulations of new behavior, that is, reenact and recom-
bine previously experienced episodes into a novel path through
the environment; and (3) how can such internal simulations in a
robot be compared with simulation theories of human cognition?
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Simulation the-
ories of cognition are introduced in Section 2, and a problem
statement of recombining previous experiences into novel simu-
lations is presented in Section 3. The modeling technique, based
on Predictive Sequence Learning (PSL), is presented in Section 4,
followed by a description of the experimental setup in Section 5.
Our hypotheses are made explicit in Section 6. Results are pre-
sented in Section 7, and the paper is concluded with a discussion
in Section 8.
2. SIMULATION THEORIES
In simple terms, simulation theories explain cognition as simu-
lated actions and perceptions. The term simulation, as used in this
paper, is more specifically related to the following two notions:
 Reactivation: Simulation is the reactivation of various brain
areas, especially areas along the sensory and motor hierarchies,
and
 Prediction: The covert or simulated actions can directly evoke
sensory activity that corresponds to the activity of the sensory
organs that has previously occurred following action execution
in that context.
Ideas relating to reactivation and prediction are not new but
have received renewed attention in the last couple of decades [e.g.,
Damasio (1994), Barsalou (1999), Möller (1999), Hesslow (2002),
Gallese (2003), and Grush (2004)]. The idea of reactivation can be
found dating (at least) as far back as the British empiricists and
associationists (Hesslow, 2002).
Alexander Bain suggested that thinking is essentially
a covert or weak form of behavior that does not acti-
vate the body and is therefore invisible to an external
observer [: : :]. Thinking, he suggested, is restrained
speaking or acting (Hesslow, 2002, p. 242).
The idea of restrained actions was also popular among some of
the behaviorists, perhaps most prominently Watson, who viewed
cognition or thinking asmotor habits in the larynx (Watson, 1913,
p. 84), cited in Hickok (2009). While the idea of reactivation in
these early theories was rather underspecified and susceptible to
criticism (for example, the finding that paralysis induced to the
muscles by curare did not have any observable effects on thinking)
(Smith et al., 1947; Hesslow, 2002), modern theories of simulation
and reactivation [e.g., Barsalou (1999), Hesslow (2002), andGrush
(2004)] further specify the nature of the reactivations (i.e., simu-
lated actions and perceptions) based on both behavioral studies
using elaborate experimental setups and a large body of neurosci-
entific evidence, e.g., Jeannerod (2001). We do not elaborate on
the empirical evidence cited in support for simulation theories in
this paper, but reviews can be found in Colder (2011), Hesslow
(2012), and Svensson (2013).
Given that simulation theories have been put forward to explain
many different cognitive phenomena and span a wide range of
disciplines, such as linguistics [e.g., Zwaan (2003)], neuroscience
(Colder, 2011), and psychology [e.g., Barsalou (1999)], they are
not entirely coherent in their particular details of implementation
and hypotheses about the underlying mechanisms. They also
differ with regard to their view of knowledge and the relation
between the cognitive agent and its environment (Svensson,
2007, 2013). However, to some extent, they share a commitment
to the reactivation hypothesis and/or the prediction hypothesis.
The following subsections provide a summary of three of the
perhaps most commonly cited simulation theories: Hesslow’s
Frontiers in Robotics and AI | www.frontiersin.org March 2016 | Volume 3 | Article 92
Billing et al. Reenacting and Recombining Sensorimotor Episodes
simulation hypothesis (Hesslow, 2002), Grush’s emulation
theory of representation (Grush, 2004), and Barsalou’s notions
of perceptual symbol systems and situated conceptualizations
(Barsalou, 1999, 2005).
2.1. Simulation Hypothesis
Hesslow (2002, 2012) argued that his simulation hypothesis rests
on three basic assumptions:
 Simulation of actions: We can activate motor structures of the
brain in a way that resembles activity during normal action but
does not cause any overt movement.
 Simulation of perception: Imagining perceiving something is
essentially the same as actually perceiving it, only the perceptual
activity is generated by the brain itself rather than by external
stimuli.
 Anticipation: There exist associative mechanisms that enable
both behavioral and perceptual activity to elicit perceptual
activity in the sensory areas of the brain (Hesslow, 2002, p. 242).
Most importantly, a simulated action can elicit perceptual activ-
ity that resembles the activity that would have occurred if the
action had actually been performed.
A central claim of the simulation hypothesis is that it is not nec-
essary to posit some part of the brain or some autonomous agent
self-performing the simulation, but the anticipation mechanism
will ensure thatmost actions are accompanied by probable percep-
tual consequences (Hesslow, 2002). That means there is no need
to posit an independent agent (i.e., homunculus) that evaluates the
simulation; rather, the (simulated) sensory events will elicit previ-
ously learned affective consequences that guide future behavior by
rewarding or punishing simulated actions. The mechanisms that
ensure that the simulations are established are likely to be realized
by neuralmechanisms located inmany different areas of the brain,
rather than there being a single neuralmechanism for anticipation
(Svensson et al., 2009b; Svensson, 2013).
2.2. Emulation Theory of Representation
Grush (2004) proposed a general theory of representation
based on the control-theoretic concept of emulation or forward
modeling. The concept of a forwardmodel is well known inmotor
control and has, in that context, also been linked to seemingly
more mental abilities such as forming mental images of actions
[e.g., Wolpert et al. (1995)].
Generally, a forwardmodel () takes the current state (xt) of the
system and a control signal (ut), and estimates the consequences
of that control signal in terms of a new state of the system (x^t+1),
at some future time t+ 1:
x^t+1 = (xt; ut) (1)
The forward model acts in combination with the controller, or
inverse model :
u^t = (xt) (2)
An illustration of an agent implementing forward and inverse
models along the principles put forward by Hesslow (2002) and
Grush (2004) is presented in Figure 1. We should, however, note
that the forward and inverse models are here depicted as associ-
ations between perceptions and actions, not functions of the sys-
tem’s state as defined in equations (1) and (2). Grush (2004) uses
a Kalman filter to compute the system state based on perceptual
information. However, Hesslow (2002) takes an associationist’s
perspective and argues for an implicit state representation.
While, as already noted above, forward and inverse models of
the motor system have been linked to mental imagery, the general
idea of simulation theories is that simulations are not restricted
to only the immediate control of the body. As can be seen in,
e.g., Barsalou (1999)’s theory of perceptual symbol systems and
situated conceptualizations, simulations can also include more
distal and distant aspects of embodied interaction (Svensson
et al., 2009b).
2.3. Perceptual Symbol Systems
Barsalou (1999, 2005) proposed a theory of perceptual symbol
systems, consisting of three parts: (1) perceptual symbols, i.e., the
reenactment of modality-specific states; (2) simulators and asso-
ciated simulations; and (3) situated conceptualizations. For read-
ability, we only focus on the latter (Barsalou, 1999) for a descrip-
tion of parts 1 and 2. According to Barsalou (2005), our ability to
categorize and conceptualize the world depends on a particular
type of simulation, which he terms situated conceptualizations,
FIGURE 1 | Left, an agent, encapsulated by a blue line, that perceives (y) and acts (u) upon its environment, depicted as a sine wave. The dashed line
depicts the inverse model , and the dotted line represents the forward model !. The prediction error given by the comparator is used to update both models (white
arrow). Right, the same agent conducting internal simulation. Here, output of the forward model is not (only) used for learning but fed back into the inverse model in
order to compute the next action. As a result, the iterative process can continue without overt interactions with the world.
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in which the conceptualizer is placed directly in the respective
situations, creating the experience of being there : : : (Barsalou,
2005, p. 627). Barsalou illustrated this as follows:
Consider a situated conceptualization for interacting
with a purring house cat. This conceptualization is
likely to simulate how the cat might appear percep-
tually. When cats are purring, their bodies take par-
ticular shapes, they execute certain actions, and they
make distinctive sounds. All these perceptual aspects
can be represented as modal simulations in the situ-
ated conceptualization. Rather than amodal redescrip-
tions representing these perceptions, simulations rep-
resent them in the relevant modality-specific systems
(Barsalou, 2005, p. 626–627).
In such a situation, simulated perceptions and actions/
emulations are connected into simulated chains of embodied
interactions that involve bodily aspects as well as physical and
social aspects of the environment and enable our conceptual
understanding of the situation.
3. PROBLEM STATEMENT
One of the key premises of simulation theories is that the capacity
to reenact previous experiences covertly allows the agent to get
away from the here and now and generate the experience of a
novel sequence of events. This allows the agent to “try out” differ-
ent scenarios without the effort and possible dangers of actually
executing them.
As an example, close your eyes and imagine yourself in your
home. You wake up, get out of the bed, go through the bedroom
door, continuing the shortest way out of the building – it is quite
easy to imagine, even if you have never taken exactly this path
before. You combine previous experiences from your home into
something new.
An abstraction of the scenario described above is given in
Figure 2.With the knowledge of getting fromA to B and fromC to
D, the internal simulation exploits that intersection to postulate a
possible way of getting fromA toD or C to B. An agent standing at
A can of course follow the known path from A toward B and look
for opportunities to reach D, but with many behaviors to choose
from the goal quickly becomes unreachable. Internal simulations
drastically reduce the effort of trying out different combinations
of known behaviors in the real world.
Despite the fact that simulation theories constitute common
sources of inspiration for roboticists, the basic scenario described
FIGURE 2 | Abstract depiction of two paths, from A to B and from C to
D. The two paths, depicted as dashed lines, share some experiences,
indicated with a dotted circle, allowing the agent to combine previously
experienced episodes into new behavior, e.g., going from A to D. See text for
details.
above has to our knowledge never been computationally analyzed
using internal simulation. Over the last two decades, compu-
tational models, such as HAMMER (Demiris and Hayes, 2002;
Demiris and Khadhouri, 2006; Demiris et al., 2014), MOSAIC
(Wolpert and Kawato, 1998; Haruno et al., 2003), MTRNN
(Yamashita and Tani, 2008), and MSTNN (Jung et al., 2015), have
received significant attention. These models all rely on prediction
and to some extent a pairing of forward and inverse models, and
somehave been used for internal simulation. But none have, to our
knowledge, been used for generating novel, goal-directed behavior
using internal simulation.
Tani (1996) presents an early approach to model-based learn-
ing using a recurrent neural network that generates an internal
simulation of future sensory input. Another example of goal-
directed planning using internal simulations was presented by
Baldassarre (2003). While both these models produce simulations
of goal-directed behavior, they do not learn from human
demonstrations.
Pezzulo et al. (2013) argued that there is a need for grounded
theories, including simulation theories, to develop better process
models of “how grounded phenomena originate during develop-
ment and learning and how they are expressed in online pro-
cessing” and that an important challenge is explaining “how
abstract concepts and symbolic capabilities can be constructed
from grounded categorical representations, situated simulations,
and embodied processes.” The grounded cognition approach
and Barsalou’s situated conceptualization (Barsalou, 1999, 2005;
Barsalou et al., 2003) suggest that abstract thinking and other cog-
nitive phenomena are based on and consist of processing involving
bodily (e.g., proprioceptive, interoceptive, and emotional) states
as well as the physical and social environment. Therefore, com-
putational models of simulation theories need to better reflect the
bodies and environments that humans inhabit to develop richer
concepts that can be used to think about the world and oneself.
Here, we directly address the latter part of this question by eval-
uating to what extent the robot model, based on the principles of
simulation theories, can internalize the environment and generate
new behavior in the form of internal simulations. Specifically, we
are interested in to what degree the robotmodel can produce goal-
directed covert action and to what degree the internal simulation
replicates the sensory–motor interactions of the overt behavior.
3.1. Computational Models of Internal
Simulation
A possible approach of implementing simulations as proposed by
Hesslow (2002) in computational agents can be found already in
the work of Rumelhart et al. (1986) on artificial neural networks.
They suggested that it is possible to “run a mental simulation” by
having one network that produces actions based on sensory input
and another that predicts how those actions change the world. By
replacing the actual inputs with the predicted inputs, the networks
would be able to simulate future events (Rumelhart et al., 1986,
p. 41–42). The assumption is that if the predicted sensory input
is similar enough to the actual sensory input, the agent can be
made to operate covertlywhere the predicted sensory input is used
instead of the actual sensory input. Two early implementations of
simulation-like mechanisms of this kind were the “Connectionist
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Navigational Map (CNM)” of Chrisley (1990) and the simulated
robot (arm) “Murphy” by Mel (1991). The theoretical motivation
behind the connectionist navigational map was the transition
from non-conceptual to conceptual knowledge [see, e.g., Barsalou
(1999)], and latermodels have focused on, for example, allocentric
spatial knowledge (Hiraki et al., 1998), learning the spatial layout
of a maze-like environment [e.g., Jirenhed et al. (2001) and Hoff-
mann and Möller (2004)], obstacle avoidance (Gross et al., 1999),
and robot dreams (Svensson et al., 2013).
These experiments have shown that the computational agents
can learn to produce internal simulations that guide behavior in
the absence of sensory input. However, it is not a trivial task to
construct such simulations. For example, one can easily imag-
ine that if predictions start to diverge from the actual sensory
states, simulations will drift and become increasingly imprecise.
Jirenhed et al. (2001) found that some behaviors caused states in
which predictions could not be learnt which hindered successful
internal simulations to develop, and Hoffmann andMöller (2004)
identified an accumulation of error as the chains of predictions
increase in length, which could restrict the ability to create longer
sequences of simulations. On the other hand, in Baldassarre
(2003)’s model, noisy predictions did not accumulate for each
time step. Others have suggested that the states in internal simula-
tions should not be judged by their correspondence to real sensory
input, rather the important aspect is that the internal simulations
constructed by the robot support successful behavior (Gigliotta
et al., 2010). For example, Ziemke et al. (2005) demonstrated a
simple internal simulation in a Khepera robot [K-Team (2007)],
using a feed forward neural network. The network generated
both actions and expected percepts, allowing the robot to reenact
earlier sensory–motor experiences andmove blindfolded through
its environment. Despite the fact that the actions produced during
internal simulation produced roughly the same coherent behavior,
the internally generated sensor percepts used for blind navigation
were actually quite different from the previously experienced real
sensory inputs.
The current models of mechanisms based on simulation the-
ories have shown the viability of creating internal models out of
simple sensory–motor associations, but the environments have
often been of very low complexity. For example, the environ-
ments consist of very simplemazes without obstacles/objects [e.g.,
Jirenhed et al. (2001) and Ziemke et al. (2005)] or with only a few
simple block shaped obstacles/objects [e.g., Tani (1996) and Gross
et al. (1999)].
Two computational models that have been used in more
complex settings are HAMMER (Demiris and Simmons, 2006;
Demiris et al., 2014) and the recurrent neural network models by
Tani and colleagues (Tani et al., 2008; Yamashita and Tani, 2008;
Jung et al., 2015).
Already in an early presentation of the model (Demiris and
Hayes, 2002), HAMMER was used for internal simulation in the
context of imitation learning. Framed as active imitation, Demiris
and Hayes (2002) present a system producing a set of parallel
internal simulations. The output of each simulation, generated
by paired forward and inverse models, is compared with the
demonstrator’s observed state, and the error is used to assign a
confidence level to each simulation. Since each pair of forward
and inverse models is trained to implement a specific behavior,
the method can be used for imitation. Together with theMOSAIC
model (Haruno et al., 2003), HAMMER constituted significant
inspiration for our own previous work on behavior recognition
(Billing et al., 2010). For further positioning of the HAMMER
architecture in relation to other cognitive architectures, please
refer to Vernon (2014).
Another topic of interest has been the formation of concepts
and abstractions of the sensorimotor flow in internal simulations.
For example, Stening et al. (2005) developed a two-level architec-
ture inwhich the higher level was able to form internal simulations
of the “rough” structure of the environment, based on simple
categories, such as “corner” or “corridor,” developed through
unsupervised learning at the lower level. Another example is
Tani et al. (2008), who investigated the development of flexible
behavior primitives achieving a kind of “organic compositional-
ity” in a humanoid robot, and the robot was also able to reactivate
the primitives internally in a mental simulation. These types of
behavior primitives could be seen as potential buildings blocks of
the situated conceptualizations suggested by Barsalou (2005).
4. PREDICTIVE SEQUENCE LEARNING
As discussed in Section 3, we are interested in investigating how
prior experiences can be combined into new, goal-directed behav-
ior during both overt and covert actions. The proposed system is
based on our earlierwork onLearning fromDemonstration (LFD)
(Billing and Hellström, 2010) and the PSL algorithm [e.g., Billing
et al. (2011a,b, 2015)]. PSL resembles many of the principles put
forward in Sections 2–3 and implements forward and inverse
models as a joint sensory–motor mapping:
e^t+1 = f (t) (3)
where et = (ut 1, yt) represents a sensory–motor event at time
t, comprising perceptions yt and actions ut 1. e^t+1 is the pre-
dicted event estimate. A sequence of events constitutes the
sensory–motor event history :
t = (e1; e2; : : : ; et) (4)
PSL constitutes a minimalist approach to prediction and
control, compared to, e.g., HAMMER (Demiris and Hayes,
2002; Demiris and Khadhouri, 2006) and CTRNN (Yamashita
and Tani, 2008), as discussed in Section 2. Both HAMMER
and CTRNN have been evaluated in LFD settings and could
be expected to produce more accurate prediction and control,
especially with high-dimensional and noisy data. However, for
the present evaluation, PSL was chosen since it, in contrast to
the HAMMER architecture, represents a fully defined algorithm,
leaving less room for platform specific interpretations. It also
takes an associationist approach to learning, implementing a
direct perception – action mapping closely resembling Hesslow’s
simulation hypothesis (Hesslow, 2012) as depicted in Figure 1
[compared with the use of a state estimate, equations (1) and (2)].
In this respect, PSL is model free (Billing et al., 2011a) and, in
the form used here, comprises only two parameters: membership
function size () and the precision constant ^. Both parameters are
described in detail below.
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With a closer connection to biology, CTRNN represents a the-
oretically interesting alternative but requires much larger training
times and could therefore pose practical problems for conducting
the kind of evaluations presented here.
In the language of control theory, we would define a trans-
fer function describing the relation between the system’s inputs
and outputs. An estimator, such as maximum likelihood, would
then be used to estimate the parameters for the model. For an
introduction to this perspective in robotics, see, e.g., Siegwart
and Nourbakhsh (2004). Here, we take a different approach and
formulate f [equation (3)] as a set of fuzzy rules, referred to
as hypotheses (h), describing temporal dependencies between a
sensory–motor event et+1 and a sequence of past events (et |h|+1,
et |h|+2, : : : , et), defined up until current time t:
h :

7τ+1 is Eh1 ^7τ+2 is Eh2 ^ : : : ^7t is Ehjhj

C)7t+1 is Eh: (5)
where 7i is the event variable, and Eh(e) is a fuzzy membership
function returning a membership value for a specific et. The
right-hand side Eh is a membership function comprising expected
events at time t+ 1. |h| denotes the length of h, i.e., the number of
left-hand-side conditions of the rule.  equals t  |h|. C represents
the confidence of h within a specific context, described in the
following section. Both E and E are implemented as standard
cone membership functions with base width " [e.g., Klir and
Yuan (1995)].
A set of hypotheses is used to compute f [equation (3)], pro-
ducing a prediction e^t+1 given a sequence of past sensory–motor
events . The process of matching hypotheses to data is described
in Section 1, and the use of PSL as forward and inverse models
during overt and covert actions is described in Section 3.
As hypotheses represent weighted associations between a
sequence of sensory–motor events, PSL can be viewed as a
variable-order Markov model. Generated hypotheses are initially
associating a single et with e^t+1; implementing a first-order
association. In cases where et does not show Markov property,
an additional hypothesis is generated: (et 1; et) ) e^t+1;
implementing a second-order association. Seen as a directed
graph between sensory–motor events, PSL implements several
aspects of a joint procedural–episodic memory (Vernon et al.,
2015). For a detailed description of the learning process of PSL,
please refer to Billing et al. (2015).
PSL is not expected to produce a better estimate in terms of
prediction error than what can be gained using control theory
approaches, but allows estimated mapping functions, defined as
sets of hypotheses, to be recombined in order to produce novel
behavior. This property is not as easily achieved using a control-
theoretic approach.
4.1. Matching Hypotheses
Given a sequence of sensory–motor events, = (e1, e2, : : : , et), a
match t(h) is given by
t (h) =
jhj 1^
i=0
Ehi (et i) (6)
where ^ is implemented as amin-function.
Hypotheses are grouped into fuzzy sets C whose membership
value C(h) describes the confidence of h at time t:
C (h) =
tP
k=th
k (h) Eh (ek+1)
tP
k=th
k (h)
(7)
where th is the creation time of h. Each set C represents a context
and can be used to implement a specific behavior or part of a
behavior. The responsibility signal t(C) is used to control which
contexts are active at a specific time. The combined confidence
value ~Ct (h), for hypothesis h, is a weighted average over all C:
~Ct (h) =
P
C
C (h)t (C)P
C
t (C)
(8)
where ~Ct is a single fuzzy set representing the combination of all
active contexts at time t. Hypotheses contribute to a prediction
in proportion to their membership in ~C, their length, and match
αt(h). The aggregated prediction E^ (et+1) is computed using the
Larsen method [e.g., Fullér (2000)]:
E^ (et+1) =
_
h
Eh (et+1) ~C(h)jhjt(h)2 (9)
During learning, new hypotheses are created when E^(et+1) <
^, that is, when the observed sensory–motor event et+1 in the
training data does not match the prediction. The precision con-
stant ^ 2 [0; 1] is, in fuzzy-logic terms, an -cut, i.e., ^ specifies
a threshold for prediction precision, where a high value results in
highly precise predictions and a large number of hypotheses, while
a small ^ renders less hypotheses, and less precise predictions [see
Billing et al. (2011b) for details].
While the PSL algorithm used here is identical to earlier work,
a different defuzzification method is used. Billing et al. (2015)
employed a center of max defuzzification method, while we here
use a probabilistic approach. E^ is treated as a probability dis-
tribution and converted to crisp values by randomly selecting
a predicted sensory–motor event e^ 2 E^ in proportion to their
membership in E^.
The PSLmapping function [equation (3)] can now be redefined
as context-dependent forward and inverse models:
y^t+1 =  (t;t) (10)
u^t =  (t;t) (11)
4.2. Illustrative Example
Figure 3 presents an example of PSL applied to a simplified robot
scenario. Consider a robot placed in an environment depicted as a
gray area in the figure. A demonstration (), comprising 8 sensory
motor events, shows how to get from its current location to the
goal (G). Using  as training data, PSL generates a knowledge base
comprising 9 hypotheses, under context C.
When placed in the test environment, PSL is used as a controller
to generate a sequence of actions from start to goal. Note that the
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starting location is not identical and that the test environment is
slightly different from the one used for training. The output pro-
duced by PSL is presented in Figure 3 as f, aligned with the event
sequence r observed while executing selected actions. At time
step 1, PSL bases its prediction on a single (blue) sensory–motor
event which, according to the knowledge base, can have three
possible outcomes (h1, h2, and h5). PSL selects among these in
proportion to the confidence levels, represented by the number
above hypotheses’ arrows in the figure. The action associated
with the selected sensory–motor event is executed and the robot
approaches the corner at time step 2. Predictions are again based
on r , h3 is selected, and a right turn is issued.
While continuing this thought example, PSL will produce
correct predictions at t= 3 and 4, incorrect prediction at t= 5
and 6, and finally catching up with correct predictions at t= 7
and 8. Errors are only perceptual and appropriate actions are
executed also in these cases, allowing the robot to stay on path
also when there are differences between predicted and observed
sensory–motor events.
FIGURE 3 | An illustrative example of PSL. A robot, illustrated as a square
with rounded corners, and an arrow indicating its direction are placed in a
simple environment with dotted lines representing obstacles. G marks the
goal location. Colored squares represent unique sensory–motor events.
See text for details.
In a realistic scenario, there will never be an exact match
between hypotheses in the knowledge base and observed per-
ceptions and actions. Matching perceived data to sensory–motor
events is controlled by the membership function [equation (5)].
A wide membership, with a large , allows many hypotheses to be
selected, increasing the robot’s ability to act also in relatively novel
situations. However, a value of  that is too large reduces precision
as a larger number of hypotheses match observed data, increasing
the risk that inappropriate actions are selected even in well-known
environments. A balance between the two allows certain variabil-
ity in the environment, while still producing stable behavior. This
balance can hence be seen as a type of exploration – exploitation
trade-off present in many machine learning approaches.
4.3. Overt and Covert Actions
Hypotheses generated by PSL are used in two modes: (1) as a
robot controller (overt action) and (2) for internal simulation
(covert action). In Mode 1, the forward model is ignored, and
psl [equation (11)] is directly used as a controller for the robot.
All sensory–motor events et comprises perceptions yt from the
robot’s sensors and actionsut =psl(t ,t). This process resembles
Figure 1 (left) with the distinction that learning is only active
when the robot is teleoperated by a human teacher.
Mode 2 resembles the right part of Figure 1. psl is here
paired with psl (Eq. 10) to create a reentrant system. Here, only
e1 = (;, y1) is taken from the robot’s sensors. All events e^t>1 are
generated by
e^t+1 =
 
psl (t;t) ;psl (t;t)

(12)
t = (e1; e^2; : : : ; e^t) (13)
As a result, the internal simulation is only based on e1, the
demonstrations used to train PSL, and the responsibility signal
t . While  is in general time varying and can be computed
dynamically, using a method for behavior recognition (Billing
et al., 2011b, 2015), it was here used as a constant goal signal.
For analytic purposes, we also need to define the prediction
error t(C):
t(C) = 1  E^(C; et) (14)
representing the error for context C at time t. E^(C; et) denotes
the context specific aggregate [equation (9)]. Asmentioned above,
et>1 is not available during covert action. In this case, we consider
et  e^t, allowing computations of prediction errors also during
internal simulation.
Based on our measure of prediction error, the confidence t(C)
in context C at time t is given by
t (C) =
t 1 (C) exp

(E(C;et) 1)2
22

NP
i=1

t 1 (Ci) exp

(E(Ci;et) 1)2
22
 (15)
This definition of confidence has its roots in the MOSAIC
architecture (Haruno et al., 2003) and has previously been used
to compute the responsibility signal t = t online (Billing et al.,
2015).
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5. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
To evaluate to what degree the model is able to produce goal-
directed behavior during both overt and covert actions, nine test
cases were evaluated. A simulated Kompaï robot (Robosoft, 2011)
placed in an apartment environment (Figure 4) was selected as
a test platform. Microsoft Robotics Developer Studio (MRDS)
was used for robot simulations. The apartment environment is
a standard example environment, freely available from Microsoft
(2015). PSL1 and related software was implemented using Java™.
Motivation and hypotheses follow in Section 6.
The Kompaï robot was equipped with a 270° laser scanner
and controlled by setting linear and angular speeds converted to
motor torques by the low-level controller. The 271 laser scans were
converted into a 20-dimensional vector where each element rep-
resents themean distance within a 13.5° segment of the laser data.
In total, each sensory–motor event e comprised 20 sensor dimen-
sions from the laser data and two motor dimensions (linear and
angular speeds). All data were sampled over 20Hz, and as a result,
each sensory–motor event had a temporal extension of 50ms.
A similar setup was used in previous evaluations of PSL (Billing
et al., 2011b, 2015). While the setup is still far from humanoid
sensor and motor complexity, the Kompaï robot is designed to act
in human environments and does represent a significant increase
in environmental and perceptual complexity compared to previ-
ous work using simulated Khepera robots (Jirenhed et al., 2001;
Stening et al., 2005; Ziemke et al., 2005; Svensson et al., 2009a).
1The Java™ implementation of Predictive Sequence Learning and related libraries
are freely available as a software repository at https://bitbucket.org/interactionlab/
psl, licensed under GNU GPL3.
Three behaviors with different start and goal locations were
demonstrated by remote controlling the robot using a joy pad:
 ToKitchen: From the storage room (Area 1) to the kitchen
(Area 2);
 ToTV : From the bed (Area 3) to the TV (Area 4);
 GoOut: From the bathroom (Area 5) to the elevator (Area 6).
Each behavior was demonstrated four times, producing a
total of 12 demonstrations. During demonstration, sensor read-
ings and executed motor commands were recorded. Laser scans
were given a maximum distance of 16m and the member-
ship function base (") was set to 1.6m. ^= 0:9 for all condi-
tions. Parameter selection was based on previous work (Billing
et al., 2015), where a similar setup was used. Preliminary
demonstrations were recorded to select suitable start and stop
locations and to verify the technical implementation. These
demonstrations were thereafter discarded. A set of 12 demon-
strations was then recorded for the final training set. These
demonstrations were verified by training PSL on all demon-
strations from a single behavior and letting PSL act as a con-
troller for the robot, reproducing the demonstrated behavior. All
demonstrations passed verification; hence, no recordings were
discarded.
For the following test cases, all 12 demonstrations were used as
training data for PSL. During training, each behavior was given a
unique context [equation (7)], allowing a top-down responsibility
signal [equation (8)] to bias selection of hypotheses when PSL
was used as a controller. As a result, the selection of specific
context can be said to indicate a goal in the form of the target
location of the corresponding behavior. PSL was trained on all 12
FIGURE 4 | Simulated apartment environment. Green, blue, and red lines indicate approximate paths from start (1, 3, and 5) to goal (2, 4, and 6) locations, for
the three demonstrated behaviors, ToKitchen, ToTV, and GoOut. See text for details.
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demonstrations for eight epochs each. One epoch is here defined
as a single presentation of all 12 demonstrations2 in randomorder.
In each test phase, the robotwas placed onone of the three start-
ing locations (Areas 1, 3, and 5, Figure 4) and executed with a top-
down responsibility signal [(C)] selecting one of the three goal
locations presented during the demonstration phase. For selected
context, (C)= 1.0. The responsibility signal for other contexts
was set to (C)= 0.1, allowing hypotheses from these contexts
to influence prediction, but down-prioritized in competition with
hypotheses trained under the selected context. See Section 4 for a
detailed mathematical formulation.
All combinations of the three starting positions and three goals
(contexts) were tested, constituting a total of nine conditions: stor-
age to kitchen (ToKitchen), bed to kitchen, bathroom to kitchen,
storage to TV, bed to TV (ToTV), bathroom to TV, storage
to elevator, bed to elevator, and bathroom to elevator (GoOut).
Note that ToKitchen, ToTV, and GoOut were the behaviors used
in the demonstration and training phase. Each condition was
executed 20 times using overt action and another 20 times using
covert action (internal simulation), producing a total of 360 trials3.
See Section 4.3 for a detailed description of the two modes of
execution.
6. HYPOTHESES
Following the basic premise presented in Section 3, success-
ful internal simulation should be able to produce realistic sen-
sory–motor interactions of a novel path through the environment.
H1: the simulated robotic system should be able to reenact
all nine conditions presented in Section 5, producing an internal
simulation connecting the sensory–motor state perceived at the
2Repeated presentation of the same training data allows PSL to form stable statistical
dependencies between sensory–motor events and to extend the temporal window,
i.e., creating longer hypotheses, when needed. This repeated presentation of sensor
data may not be completely realistic from a biological point of view but can be seen
as a standard method similar to the many epochs used when training, e.g., artificial
neural networks.
3Log files from human demonstrations and all 360 simulated trails are available for
download at https://bitbucket.org/interactionlab/psl/branch/reenact
starting point, with the sensory–motor state corresponding to
the goal.
In humans and animals, internal simulations happen at dif-
ferent temporal scales (Svensson et al., 2009b; Svensson, 2013),
comprising automatic unconscious mental simulations involved
in, for example, perception that occur at a very rapid time scale
and often involve detailed sensor andmotor states [e.g., Gross et al.
(1999), Möller (1999), and Svensson et al. (2009b)]. Deliberate
mental simulations, e.g., mental imagery, occur at time scales
corresponding to the overt behavior (Guillot and Collet, 2005).
For example, Anquetil and Jeannerod (2007) studied humans
performing mental simulations of grasping actions in both first
and third person perspectives. The time to complete simulated
actions was found to be closely similar in the two conditions.
The approach used here runs internal simulations solely on a
sensory–motor level, with exactly the same speed (20Hz) as the
overt behavior.
H2: internal simulations are therefore expected to display a
similar temporal extension as the corresponding overt behavior.
7. RESULTS
Figure 5A presents sensor perceptions (laser scans) generated
during overt action, plotted in relation to the executed path from
the bed (Area 5, Figure 4) to the kitchen (Area 2). While both
bed and kitchen were present as start and goal locations in the
training data, the path from bed to kitchen was not demonstrated.
The robot model combines previously experienced episodes from
several different demonstrations into a novel path, correspond-
ing to the schematic illustration from A to D presented in
Figure 2.
The path from bed to kitchen was also executed covertly
(Figure 5B). In this case, actions were not sent to the robot
controller and the path (black line) was reconstructed from the
sequence of covert actions. Presented sensor percepts are not
taken from the robot’s sensors, but instead generated by the
internal (PSL) model.
As an illustration of how information from the different
demonstrations were used during internal simulation, prediction
A B
FIGURE 5 | Illustration of sensory–motor interactions along a path from bed (Area 5, Figure 4) to the kitchen (Area 2), using overt (A) and covert (B)
action. An approximate path is generated from executed actions and illustrated as a black line. Colored points represent laser scans in relation to the executed path,
from start (green) to goal (red). This path was not presented during training and corresponds to the A to D path in Figure 2, i.e., a novel path generated through the
recombination of previously experienced episodes. Blue circles along the path mark 2.5-s intervals.
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errors, and confidence levels for each context (behavior) is
presented in Figure 6. As visible in the figure, the ToTV context
is initially generating relatively small prediction errors, leading to
high confidence levels for this context (c.f. Section 3). After about
10 s, ToTV is starting to produce larger errors, leading to a switch
in confidence to the ToKitchen context. This switch is the result
of a strong responsibility signal [t(C)] for the ToKitchen context
and also associated with the robot turning toward the kitchen (c.f.
Figure 5).
Both examples presented in Figure 5 are successful in the sense
that the correct goal, indicated by the top-down signal , was
reached. Over all nine conditions executed with overt action, the
correct goal was reached in 65% of all runs. In 29% of the runs,
one of the remaining two goals was reached, leaving 6%of the runs
failed, in the sense that no goal was reached.
In runs with covert action, the robot did not move. In
order to determine how the internal simulation terminated, the
sensory–motor patterns of all 180 covert runs were plotted (as
in Figure 5B) and the goal was visually identified. Over all nine
conditions, the correct goal was reached in 75% of all runs, a
different goal was reached in 7% of the runs and 18% of the runs
were classified as failed.
Goal reaching frequencies for each condition, including both
overt and covert runs, are presented inFigure 7. Examples of failed
internal simulations and internal simulations reaching the wrong
goal are given in Figure 8.
7.1. Simulation Time
In order to test hypothesis 2 (Section 6), simulation time is com-
pared to the time of the overt behavior, presented in Figure 9.
Some conditions, Bed to Kitchen and Bathroom to TV, display
similar temporal distributions. However, seen over all conditions,
the correlation between overt and covert execution times is weak,
with internal simulations producing both longer (Storage to TV)
and shorter (bottom three conditions, Figure 9) execution times.
A two-tailed t-test over all runs reveals a significant difference
between overt and covert execution times (p< 0.005).
The strongest difference between overt and covert execution
times is found in conditions Storage to TV and Bed–Elevator, with
the former showing longer covert execution times, and the latter
shorter times for covert runs. A deeper analysis of these conditions
is presented below.
Typical runs from Storage to TV are displayed in Figure 10.
The internal simulation (b) is semantically correct; it replicates
all important aspects of the overt execution (a), but misrepresents
the first part of the path, through the storage room depicted in
green. The total execution time of the simulated path is in this case
almost twice as long as its overt counterpart, 30 versus 18 s. The
time of exit from the storage room is 17.5 s in the covert condition
and 4.0 s in the overt case, implying that the vast majority of the
temporal difference between the two conditions appears in the
storage room.
This distortion of the internal simulation could not be
explained by a difference in prediction error. A two tailed t-test
showed no significant difference between prediction errors for
overt and covert conditions over the relevant periods, 0< t< 4 s
and 0< t< 7.5 s, respectively (p= 0.24). The observed distortion
may instead be explained by a closer analysis of the PSL model.
Figures 10C,D depicts number ofmatching hypotheses over time.
The number of matching hypotheses is here defined as number
of h for which t(h)> 0 [c.f. Equation (6)]. A large number of
matching hypotheses indicate larger uncertainty in the model.
Both overt and covert runs display an initial period where a rela-
tively large number of hypotheses match present sensory–motor
events. Both these periods roughly correspond to the time it took
to exit the storage room, 4 and 17.5 s, respectively.
In overt mode, large model uncertainty is not a problem
as long as suitable actions are selected. Events are driven for-
ward through interaction with the environment. However, in
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FIGURE 6 | Prediction errors and confidence levels for overt (A) and covert (B) runs from bed to kitchen, as depicted in Figure 5. Values are given for
each context (c.f. Section 5). See Section 3 for definitions.
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A B
FIGURE 8 | (A) Internal simulation from the storage room (Area 1, Figure 4), here depicted in green, to the TV (Area 4), depicted in red. The simulation diverges
from the path indicated by the active context (ToTV) and terminates in a sensory–motor pattern more similar to the elevator (Area 6). (B) Unsuccessful internal
simulation from bed (Area 5, Figure 4) to the kitchen (Area 2). The simulation appears to mistake the bed for the entrance corridor and terminates quickly in front of
the elevator.
covert mode, the PSL model must also produce suitable per-
ceptions in order to drive the internal simulation. A larger
number of matching hypotheses is likely to produce oscillating
perceptions, leading to simulation distortion. This explanation is
further supported by significantly larger prediction errors being
generated in the storage room, compared to the rest of the exe-
cuted path. This difference was observed during covert simulation
(p< 0.005), but not for the overt condition (p= 0.14).
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FIGURE 9 | Execution time, i.e., time to reach the goal, from all successful runs in each condition. Solid and dashed lines represent the 95% confidence
interval of the means of overt and covert runs, respectively. Conditions with few successful runs are displayed as  marking execution times for individual runs,
rather than a distribution.
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FIGURE 10 | Typical runs from condition Storage to TV. Upper plots present laser scans in relation to the executed path, generated during overt (A) and covert
(B) runs from storage room (green) to TV (red). Blue circles along the path, represented by the black line, mark 2.5-s intervals. Lower plots present number of
matching hypotheses over time, for overt (C) and covert (D) runs. See text for details.
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A similar analysis of Bed–Elevator (Figure 11) reveals the
opposite effect. In this case, the covert execution reproduces both
start and goal correctly but misses parts of the path in between.
Specifically, the corridor leading up to the elevator, visible in the
overt run (a) is missing in the internal simulation (b). While
the first 15 s of the covert run appears similar to its overt coun-
terpart, the total time is much shorter, 18 s compared to 29 s.
Hence, the shorter simulation time is due to a lost segment of
the simulation rather than a general increase in execution speed
over the whole simulation. At t= 15 s, the robot is approaching
a door leading to the corridor, followed by a left turn toward
the elevator. An enlargement of this sequence of events, from
t= 14 s to t= 20 s, is presented in Figure 11C. The door shows
up in the figure as a narrow passage just before the left turn. It is
likely that sensory interactions, when exiting the door and facing
the corridor wall, are similar to perceptions when approaching
the elevator. This hypothesis is confirmed by comparing sensor
events from the covert condition to a subset of events from
the overt case, when approaching the elevator (24< t< 26 s).
A period between 16.25 and 17 s from the covert case shows
very similar sensor interactions to the selected period from the
covert condition. This pinpoints the time where events from the
door passage are confused with events form the elevator, and a
segment for the original path disappears. Figure 11D presents a
magnification of the covert condition, with laser scans prior to
16.5 s are colored in green and scans after 16.5 s are red. Green
scans belong to the door passage, while red scans represent the
elevator.
8. DISCUSSION
We present a robot model that can execute both overt and
covert actions based on human demonstrations. The presented
system, implemented on a simulated Kompaï robot (Robosoft,
2011), can learn from several demonstrations and execute a novel
path through an apartment environment toward a goal. We also
demonstrate that the system is able to generate internal simu-
lations of sensory–motor experiences from executing a specific
goal-directed behavior.
The model presents an associationist’s approach to control
an internal simulation, representing knowledge as coordination
between perceptions and actions. Hence, despite the fact that
the model is evaluated as a method for path following and
generation, the system state is only represented implicitly, and
very little application specific information is introduced. Mod-
els using simulated experience [c.f. Sutton and Barto (1998)] to
improve valuations of explicitly represented system states exist
in the form of reinforcement learning Dyna-based algorithms
[e.g., Santos et al. (2012) and Lowe and Ziemke (2013)]. How-
ever, these algorithms are limited to updating (either randomly
or heuristically) already experienced states and do not simulate
novel paths. We use a morphologically simple robot, allowing
us to study the principles of simulation in human-like envi-
ronments without introducing the complexity of a humanoid
robot. The selected platform [Microsoft (2015)] is freely avail-
able, facilitating replication of, and comparisons with, the present
study.
The results provide support for Hypothesis 1 (Section 6). The
system can generate the sensory–motor experiences of executing
a novel path through the environment, without actually executing
these actions. The robot model is able to pursue goals during
both overt and covert behaviors. While the proportion of runs
leading to a goal was slightly lower in the covert condition (82%),
compared to 94% during overt action, the robot’s ability to pursue
the correct goal is significantly better during covert action.
One possible interpretation of this result is that internal sim-
ulation could potentially be beneficial as a training exercise since
difficult skills are “easier” to execute covertly, increasing the likeli-
hood of successful reenaction. Motor imagery and other forms of
imagery have been used to increase the performance of athletes
and for rehabilitation (Guillot and Collet, 2005; Munzert et al.,
2009). Of particular interest to our experiment is the work of
Vieilledent et al. (2003), who investigated the influence of mental
imagery on path navigation. In their study, subjects were to nav-
igate blindfolded three different 12.5-m long hexagonal shapes,
indicated by wooden beams laid out on the floor. They found
that a learning period, including either mental imagery, men-
tal imagery, and simultaneous walking or walking with sensory
feedback from a wooden beam, resulted in increased perfor-
mance compared to a resting condition or walking withoutmental
imagery.
In a similar study, Commins et al. (2013) did not find any
increase in performance of mental imagery, but they did find
that errors increased with distance in both the actual walking
condition and imagery condition. Thus, more studies are needed
to investigate the actual benefit of mental imagery in navigation.
While it is possible that there are several factors that contribute
to the differences in performance, our finding that goal pursuit is
easier to execute covertly might be a clue to why mental training
is advantageous in some cases.
With regard to the differences observed between the overt and
covert runs, it should be noted that humans do not necessarily
perform perfectly when acting based on internal simulations.
Vieilledent et al. (2003) and Commins et al. (2013) showed that
blind navigation resulted in similar trajectories and relatively
accurate behaviors in terms of both deviation from target and
temporal extension, but Vieilledent et al. (2003) found that in
the blindfolded condition, the path was not as straight and turns
where not as sharp leading to a more circular shape and also some
distortions of the overall shape. From a simulation theory per-
spective, it would be suggested that even the blindfolded walking
is based on chained simulations of covert actions and percep-
tions, but in this case guided by the additional proprioceptive
feedback.
In light of these results, we should not expect the robot
model to reproduce a perfect trajectory toward the target dur-
ing covert action. This appears to be the case. We hypothesized
(H2, Section 6) that successful internal simulations should have
the same temporal extension as their overt counterpart. This
hypothesis was not confirmed. The model generated internal
simulations that were both longer and shorter than the overt coun-
terparts, producing significantly different temporal distributions
compared to overt results. Two cases were analyzed in detail: (1)
indicating prolongation due to sensory–motor event oscillation
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FIGURE 11 | Typical runs from condition Bed–Elevator. (A) Laser scans in relation to the path, executed overtly from bed (green) to the elevator (red). Blue
circles along the path, represented by the black line, mark 2.5-s intervals. (B) Corresponding laser scans generated in covert mode. (C) Magnification of selected
period (14–20 s) from the overt condition. (D) Corresponding (15–17 s) magnification from covert condition. See text for details.
caused by high model uncertainty (Figure 10) and (2) abbrevia-
tion caused by strong event similarities along the simulated path
(Figure 11).
These results indicate that multiple types of distortions could
affect internal simulations. If similar effects are present also during
human mental imagery, we should be able to find longer simula-
tion times in situations that are difficult for participants to reenact
covertly. It is also possible that participants demonstrate shorter
execution times during mental imagery in cases where it is easy
for participants to mistake one location for another, causing parts
of the path to be left out from the internal simulation. Both these,
and other, effects may appear simultaneously, and it may therefore
be difficult to analyze mental imagery solely based on its total
execution time.
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